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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78A-3-102(3)G) and (4). 
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Issue #1 
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, concluding this 
action was barred by Goldenwest's failure to timely commence this action under 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-307. 
Standard of Review 
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant 
or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We 
review matters of statutory construction for correctness." Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Haik, 334 P.3d 490, 494 2014 UT App 193,, 8. 
Issue #2 
Whether a genuine issue of material facts exists concerning whether the 
agreement for Ms. Kenworthy to pay $200 per month was a separate oral agreement 
or modification of the written contact between Ms. Kenworthy and Goldenwest. 
Standard of Review 
"The issue of whether a contract exists may present both questions of law and 
fact, depending on the nature of the claims raised. Thus, our standard of review for 
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this issue turns on whether the claim is one of fact or law, because a ruling on whether 
a contract exists may embody several subsidiary rulings. The trial court first finds the 
facts to which the law will be applied, and then it applies the law to those facts to 
reach a conclusion oflaw." Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 
1373, 1375 (Utah App. 1993). 
Issue #3 
Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Ms. Kenworthy, as 
the prevailing party under the contract. 
Standard of Review 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which 
we review for correctness .... the determination of which party prevailed in a civil 
action--and thus may be entitled to attorney fees--is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion." Federated Capital Corp. v. Haner, 351 P.3d 816, 819, 2015 UT App. 132, 
STATUTES, RULES & REGULATIONS 
U.R.C.P. 78B-2-113. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay. 
( 1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute 
of limitations from the date: 
(a) the debt arose; 
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by 
the debtor; or 
(c) a payment is made on the debt by the debtor. 
U.R.C.P. 78B-2-307. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
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(I) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received: 
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writino· o, 
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; or 
( c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials 
furnished; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, 
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for 
action to one year, under Section 25-6-1 O; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); and 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
U.R.C.P. 78B-2-309. Within six years -- Mesne profits of real property -- Instrument 
in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
( 1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78B-2-311; and 
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused by wildland fire. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On May 13, 2014, Plaintiff, Goldenwest Federal Credit Union 
C'Goldenwest"), commenced this action by serving default Defendant, Kathleen 
Kenworthy ("Ms. Kenworthy"), with a 10-day Summons and Complaint, then filing 
the Complaint on May 15, 2014. [R. 168 Finding of Pact #10] 
2. On December 22, 2014, the court entered a Ruling and Order granting 
Ms. Kenworthy's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Ruling"). [R. 168] 
3. On February 24, 2015, Ms. Kenworthy moved for an award of attorney 
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fees, pursuant to the terms of her written agreement with Goldenwest. [R. 175-202] 
4. On April 14, 2015, after Goldenwest, represented by prior counsel, 
failed to object to Ms. Kenworthy's Motion for Attorney Fees, the court entered an 
order awarding fees to Ms. Kenworthy. [R. 210-213] 
5. Goldenwest filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2015. [R. 214-217] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decision of the trial court was based on the following undisputed facts 
which are relevant to this appeal: 
1. Goldenwest and Ms. Kenworthy entered into a loan agreement (the 
"Original Agreement") on April 24, 2006. [R. 167] 
2. On May 9, 2008, the Parties orally agreed to Ms. Kenworthy's 
repayment of debt in the amount of $200 per month. [R. 168] 
3. On May 9, 2008, Ms. Kenworthy paid Goldenwest $200. [R. 168] 





The alleged debt at issue in the Complaint arose before May 12, 2008. 
Goldenwest served Ms. Kenworthy with a Complaint for the present 
case on May 13, 2014, and filed the Complaint with this Court on May 15, 2014. [R. 
168] 
7. Ms. Kenworthy made the $200 payment by credit card and a copy of the 
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credit card receipt was submitted without objection as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of 
Shanna Hmvell, filed with Goldenwest's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment. [R. 84-87, Affidavit 15] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After defaulting on her vehicle loan, Ms. Kenworthy orally agreed to modify 
her monthly payments from $487 .21 per month, due by the 15th day of each month; to 
$200 per month, also due on or before the 15th day of the month. Ms. Kenworthy 
made the first modified payment on May 9, 2008. When Ms. Kenworthy failed to 
make her next scheduled payment on June 15, 2008, she breached the Contract and 
the cause of action accrued on June 16, 2008. Since Ms. Kenworthy's loan was 
formalized in a written agreement, Goldenwest had until June 16, 2014, to commence 
an action to enforce the Loan Agreement. By filing its lawsuit on May 13, 2014, 
Goldenwest timely commenced this action and the trial court's conclusion that the 
Complaint was untimely should be reversed. 
Since the award of attorney fees is based upon a written agreement, if this 
Court reverses the trial court's ruling that the Complaint was untimely, the award of 
attorney fees to Kenworthy must also be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT RUN BEFORE THIS 
ACTION WAS COMMENCED. 
On April 24, 2006, the parties entered into the Original Agreement to finance 
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the purchase of a vehicle. The Original Agreement required Ms. Kenworthy to repay 
the loan in installments of $487 .21 per month by the 15 th day of the month. Payments 
were made until February 15, 2008. On May 9, 2008, Ms. Kenworthy contacted 
Goldenwest to discuss her financial problems and inability to pay the monthly 
installments. At that time, the parties orally agreed to reduce Ms. Kenworthy's 
monthly payments to $200, with the payments still due by the 15th day of the month. 
In Utah, "Civil actions may be commenced ... after the cause of action has 
accrued." UT AH CODE ANN. § 7 8B-2-102. A cause of action for breach of contract 
accrues when the contract is breached. Stillwell v. People's Bldg., Loan & Sav. 
Ass'n. 57 P. 14, 17 (Utah 1899) ("Before breach of contract no cause of action 
accrues.") A cause of action related to a debt does not accrue until a payment is due 
and owing, because it is only at that point, that a party may attempt to enforce the 
agreement. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,313 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (''Ordinarily a 
cause of action for a debt begins to run when the debt is due and payable because at 
that time an action can be maintained to enforce it." (Internal quotation marks 
omitted); Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983). Utah 
appellate courts recognize that breach occurs in installment contracts when the 
installment is due. Moab Nat. Bank v. Keystone-Wallace Resources, 517 P.2d 1020, 
30 Utah 2d 330 (Utah 1973). The proper application of this principal on similar facts 
is found in Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Templeton, 646 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn.App. 
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1982). 
In Templeton, the Tennessee Court of Appeals was asked to apply its six (6) 
year statute of limitations for written contracts to default of payments of an 
installment note. In Templeton, three (3) installments were not fully paid, but an 
action was not brought until eight (8) years after the first installment was missed. In 
concluding the lawsuit was untimely as to the first two installments, the court stated, 
"[t]he determinative issue in this case is when did the cause of action accrue." The 
court then held: 
Furthermore, the cause of action accrues on each installment when it 
becomes due and the Statute begins to run from that moment on that 
installment. Further, suit may be brought in successive actions upon 
each default in an installment for the amount of that defaulted 
installment. Whether or not the note contains an acceleration clause, 
exercised or not, is of no moment to the defaulted installment. All the 
acceleration clause does is accelerate the due date of future installments 
to the date of the exercise of the right of acceleration. Therefore, the 
cause of action accrued on the 1972 and 1973 installments in December 
of each of those years. The accrual of the right of action for each of 
those installments occurred more than six years prior to the filing of this 
suit. 
Id. at 923. 
This is consistent with the common law rule that, "[i]n the case of an 
obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each 
installment from the time it becomes due, that is, from the time when an action might 
be brought to recover it." 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions,§ 133. Moreover, 
where an installment contract contains an acceleration clause, the cause of action does 
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not accrue as to installments, which are not due until those installments are 
accelerated. Id. 
Here, the trial court appears to have become confused by the effect of the oral 
agreement to reduce monthly payments to $200. The trial court's confusion appears 
to come from its misinterpretation of UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-2-113(1), which states: 
An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable 
statute of limitations from the date: 
(a) the debt arose; 
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is 
made by the debtor; or 
( c) a payment is made on the debt by the debtor. 
On Page 4 of the Ruling [R. 170], the trial court states, "[t]he parties entered 
into the Original Agreement on April 24, 2006 and the statute of limitations began 
running as of that date under §78B-2-l 13(l)(a), when the 'debt arose'". The trial 
court's failure to properly interpret the meaning of the term "debt arose" is the basis 
of the trial court's misapplication of the statute of limitations. By saying the "debt" 
arose on April 24, 2006 - the date Ms. Kenworthy signed the note, the trial court 
equated "debt arose" with "obligation begins." Goldenwest equates the term "debt 
arose" with "performance due." 
Because of its erroneous interpretation of section §78B-2-113( l)(a), the trial 
court misapplied this section by concluding the debt arose under §78B-2-113(1)(a) on 
April 24, 2006, and renewed with each monthly payment until February 15, 2008, 
when Ms. Kenworthy missed her first payment. [R. 169] The trial court does not 
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explain whether it chose to run the statute on February 15, 2008 (the due date of the 
first missed payment), or the day after the January 2008 payment. Either way, the 
court appears to have concluded the six (6) year limitation period ended no later than 
February 15, 2014, and since this action commenced on May 13, 2014, it was late. 
Moreover, the court interpreted the term "debt arose" to mean the entire remaining 
balance of the loan, and not the amount of an overdue installment. Therefore, the 
court effectively accelerated the entire debt in January or February of 2008 and ran 
the statute on the full unpaid balance. [R. 169-170] 
Goldenwest takes exception with this conclusion because it neglects to 
properly analyze that this was an installment agreement and several installments are 
within the six (6) year statute of limitations because of the oral agreement modifying 
the monthly payment. 
1. The modification cured the breach. 
When Ms. Kenworthy missed her installment payment on February 15, 2008, 
she was in breach as to that payment. She similarly defaulted on her March 15 and 
April 15, 2008, payments. Therefore, when she and Goldenwest agreed to reduce her 
monthly payment in May 2008 and she paid $200 on May 9, 2008, she was not in 
breach of the May payment. However, that was her last payment and she 
subsequently missed all other installments. Those installments either came due on the 
15 th day of each succeeding month or if/when Goldenwest accelerated the debt. 
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However, the trial court had no evidence and made no finding that the debt was 
accelerated before May 14, 2008 (six years before this action was filed.) Indeed, the 
trial court concluded, from the undisputed facts, that Ms. Kenworthy's payments 
would be $200 per month until the loan was fully paid. [R. 168, 12] From that 
finding, it is clear that the debt was not accelerated and the revised payment 
arrangement cured Ms. Kenworthy's prior breach by allowing her to pay the balance 
in monthly installments of $200. Thus, until Ms. Kenworthy breached her payment 
on June 15, 2008, Goldenwest had no cause of action. Accordingly, the only 
remaining question for this Court is the effect, if any, of the oral agreement on the 
statute of limitations. 
2. The modification did not remove the written agreement from the statute of 
limitations for a written contract. 
From Goldenwest' s perspective, its agreement to reduce the monthly payment 
to $200, together with Ms. Kenworthy's payment of $200 on May 9, 2008; was a 
modification of the contract, which cured her prior breach and tolled the statute of 
limitations until June 16, 2018, the day after Ms. Kenworthy missed her next 
scheduled payment. 
In its ruling, the trial court did not decide whether the agreement to pay $200 
was a separate oral agreement or a modification of a written agreement because the 
court concluded that either way, it was governed by the four (4) year statute of 
limitations found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B -2-307{l)(a). The court stated: 
Page I 10 
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If [the payment reduction was] a new oral agreement, the renewal 
provision would toll a four-year limitations period from May 9, 2008, 
when "the debt arose". If the Parties' agreement made an oral 
modification of the material terms to the written Original Agreement, 
the four-year statute of limitations for oral agreement would begin May 
9, 2008. 
[R. 170-171]. 
Generally, determining whether an oral agreement is a modification of a 
written agreement or a new contract is a question of fact. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. 
Shields, 882 P .2d 650, 65 5 (Utah 1994 ). However, when the facts are undisputed, 
questions of fact become questions of law. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 
1209 (Utah App. 1997) ("Generally, whether a breach is material is a question of fact 
to be decided by the jury, unless the facts are undisputed; then it is a question of law 
for the court.") 
Since the facts surrounding the agreement to reduce the payment are not in 
dispute, whether the agreement was a modification to the Original Agreement or 
separate oral agreement is a question of law which this Court can decide. Cal 
Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah App. 1993). 
Thus, Goldenwest assigns error to the conclusion that a narrow oral modification of a 
written agreement, which can be proven without resort to parol evidence, is subject to 
the four ( 4) year statute for oral agreements. 
3. The agreement to reduce the payment was a modification. 
As the moving party who bore the burden of establishing the elements and 
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supporting evidence of an issue on which she bore the burden of proof1, Ms. 
Kenworthy offered no law or analysis to explain when an oral agreement is a 
modification of a separate agreement. While there are Utah cases whish state such a 
difference exists2, there is no case law in Utah explaining the method for making this 
determination. Regardless, it is clear from existing Utah precedent that the reduction 
of the payment was a modification. 
Utah courts have long recognized that oral modifications are enforceable, 
particularly where performance has occurred. Bamberger Co. v. Certified 
Productions, Inc., 48 P.2d 489, 88 Utah 194 (Utah 1935), R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 
40 PJd 1119, 2002 UT 11 (Utah 2002). Ms. Kenworthy performed her obligation for 
May 2008 by paying $200 on May 9, 2008. Her next payment was then due on June 
15, 2008. 
In Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1995), this Court stated: 
It is settled that the parties to a contract may modify all or any portion of 
that contract. Moreover, a condition precedent to enforcement of a 
modified contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definiteness. 
Id. at 1177 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court then held 
that the parties had a meeting of the minds and orally modified a written 
escrow agreement where they "narrowly modified" a single term of the 
1 Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT2, 177 P.3d 600, ~ 17. 
2 Ron Shepherd Ins .• supra 
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contract-the due date of annual payments; and through their conduct, 
observed that modification. Here, Goldenwest and Ms. Kenworthy narrowly 
modified the Original Agreement by reducing the amount of the monthly 
payment. Their minds met when Ms. Kenworthy paid and Goldenwest 
accepted the $200 payment on May 9, 2008. 
Fisher further requires that any modification meet the requirements of 
the statute of frauds3: 
The general rule is that any modification of a contract that is within the 
statute of frauds must also comply with the statute of frauds. When a 
contract is required to be in writing, the same requirement applies with 
equal force to any alteration or modification thereof. Under the Utah 
Statute of Frauds, the original escrow agreement was required to be in 
writing. Thus, at first blush, the oral modification seems to violate the 
statute of frauds. However, a recognized and accepted exception to the 
statute of frauds provides if a party has changed his position by 
performing an oral modification so that it would be inequitable to permit 
the other party to found a claim upon the original agreement the 
modified agreement should be held valid. Thus, where there is evidence 
of part performance under the modified agreement, and where it would 
be inequitable to permit a party to repudiate the oral modification and 
seek enforcement of the written contract, the oral agreement may be 
removed from the statute of frauds and enforced. 
Id. at 1176-1177 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). Ms. Kenworthy 
fully performed the modified agreement by making her $200 payment on May 
9, 2008. Thereafter, as long as she continued to make her monthly $200 
payments, it would have been inequitable for Goldenwest to pursue an action 
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4( 1 )(a) provides that a contract which by its terms cannot be performed within one 
year must be in writing. 
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against her for the full amount of any monthly payment - $487 .21. 
4. The oral modification did not being the case within the statute of limitations 
for an oral agreement. 
The trial court relied upon Strand v. Union Pacific Railroad /Co., 6 Utah 2d 
279,282, 312; P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1957) for the proposition that oral terms of a 
written contract require application of the statute of limitation for oral agreements. [R. 
171] In Strand, a contractor and railroad company verbally agreed to materially 
change several terms of their construction agreement. These included: 
the railroad would make an adjustment including insurance and 
expenses so that [the contractor] would not lose a dime; that although 
the contract specified July 1, 1944, as the completion date, the railroad 
would extend the time to December, 1944, 'by Christmas'; that all costs 
and expenses from the beginning to the end of the job would be paid so 
that [the contractor] would be reimbursed for his losses; and that the 
railroad would pay for capital expenditures and depreciation on 
equipment in connection with the job. 
Id. at 562. 
However, in Strand, all of the evidence of the altered terms was parol, and the 
contract was a construction contract, which was not subject to the written 
requirements of statute of frauds. Therefore, Strand is inapplicable because: 1) the 
terms of the modification here can be proven without resort to parol evidence; and 2) 
this contract and oral modification are within the statute of frauds. 
Strand is a construction case which adopts a mle from a Texas construction 
case, holding that contracts which are partly oral and partly written are governed by 
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the statute of limitations for oral agreements. However, Texas courts have recognized 
that if the oral portion of the agreement is within the statute of frauds, the contract is 
governed by the statute of limitations for written agreements. 
In Texas Western Railway Co. v. Gentrv, 1888, 69 Tex. 625, 8 S.W. 98, 101, 
the Texas Supreme Court concluded the resolution of a board of directors signed by 
the officers, "is a memorandum in writing as required by the statute of frauds, and that 
as such, it can be lawfully enforced." Id. Further, 
[i]f a resolution duly entered and signed can be a writing under the 
statutes of frauds, it must be a contract in writing within the meaning of 
the statute of limitations, where it shows upon its face that it is intended 
as the final acceptance of a previous agreement. 
Id. Therefore, where an agreement is governed by the statute of frauds and the 
evidence of the terms of the agreement are sufficient to meet the requirement of the 
statute of frauds, the written nature of the agreement is established and the oral nature 
of any evidence is not determinative of the treatment of the contract, for purposes of 
the statute of limitations. 
Here, the final expression of the agreement reducing payments to $200 is the 
receipt for Ms. Kenworthy's credit card payment, reflecting her agreement to pay the 
reduced amount. More importantly, all of the terms can be ascertained by reference to 
written documents: 1) the amount of original obligation and interest rate are in 
writing; 2) the amount of the reduced payment is reflected in the written receipt; and 
3) the adjusted repayment term can be ascertained though calculation, using the 
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outstanding balance; interest rate; and the new installment amount. There are no 
modified terms which must be proven by parol. Accordingly, rather than applying the 
four ( 4) year statute for oral agreements, the correct application of Strand is to keep 
this case within the six (6) year statute for written contracts. This is true because: 
a written promise to pay without naming the amount may be construed 
as founded on a written instrument where an objective standard for 
determining the price is provided in the instrument, even though the 
amount must be ascertained by evidence [ from elsewhere]. 
Id. at 563. 
B. ATTORNEY FEES 
On February 24, 2015, Ms. Kenworthy filed a motion for an award of attorney 
fees, as the prevailing party under the reciprocal fee provision in UTAH CODE ANN.§ 
78B-5-826. Under prior counsel, Goldenwest did not object to that motion. The court 
awarded fees pursuant in its Order entered on April 14, 2015. Since Goldenwest did 
not object to the entry of fees before the trial court, it did not preserve the ability to 
challenge the amount of fees on appeal. However, the award of fees was based on 
Ms. Kenworthy being the prevailing party under the reciprocal fee provision in UT AH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. If this Court reverses the decision of the trial court, Ms. 
Kenworthy will no longer be a prevailing party and there will be no legal basis for her 
to receive fees. For that reason, Goldenwest requests that the award of attorney fees 
be reversed. Watkins v. Ford, 239 P.3d 526, 2010 UT App 243 (Utah App. 2010) 
(Reversing reciprocal award of fees and awarding fees under contact for trial and 
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appeal.) Goldenwest further requests that the issue of expenses, including attorney 
fees for this appeal, be evaluated by the trial court when a final order is entered. 
General Const.·& Development. Inc. v. Peterson Plumbin2 Supplv, 248 P.3d 972, 
974, 2011 UT 1, ~ 13. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Goldenwest asks this Court to reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment and conclude the statute of limitations for written 
agreements, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-3-309, governs the time for filing 
this action; that the reduction of the payment amount is a medication to the Original 
Agreement; and reverse the award of attorney fees to Ms. Kenworthy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 2016. 
SMITH;KNOWLES, P.C. 
~ .)auJ,/· £ 
·--Dana T. Farmer 
Attorney for Appellant 
Goldenwest Federal Credit Union 
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ADDENDUM#l 
(Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment) 
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By 
FILED DJS 
Third Ju/~ICT COURT 
ic1a/ District 
DEC 2 2 20/i 
SALT~KE 
couNry 
IN THE TI-IlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAIB OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
GOLDENWEST FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION, 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff; 
V. 
KATHLEEN F. K.ENWORTIIY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 149905786 
Judge Eli2abeth Hruby-Mills 
DAIB: December 22, 2014 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 8, 
2014. PJaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion dated August 22, 2014, and Defendant filed a Reply 
Memorandllllldated August 29, 2014. Comtheld oral argument on this Motion on November 7, 
2014. Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendant for an alleged breach of contract Defendant requests 
entry of summary judgment based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The Comt 
grants Defendant's Motion for Sumnary Judgment and enters the following order. 
FlNDINGS OF FACT 
1. PlaintiffGoldenwest Federal Credit Union and Defendant Kathleen Kenworthy (collectively 
"Parties") entered into a loan agreement ('Original Agreement') on April 24, 2006. Cornp1aint 
15; Answer. 
1 
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2. On May 9, 2008, the Parties orally agreed to Defendant's repayment of debt in the amotmt of 
$200 per month. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Opposition"), Statement of Additional Facts 13; Reply Memorandtnn in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Swmiary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims ("Reply"), Argument Section 
Ill. 
3. On May 9, 2008, Defendant paid Plaintiff$200. Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts, 
4. 
4. Defendant made no payments to Plaintiff after May 9, 2008. Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims ("Motion"), ,r 3; Opposition, ,r 
3. 
5. The alleged debt at issue in the Complaint arose before May 12, 2008. Complaint ,r 3. 
6. On March 2, ·2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant ("Previous Case'). 
Goldenwest Federal Credit Union v. Kathleen Kenworthy, case no. 110905153 DC (Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah) (2011 ). 
7. On March 25, 2011, in the Previous Case, Defendant filed an Answer and Cowiterclaim 
("2011 Counterclaim') against Plaintiff: Id. 
8. In the 2011 Counterclaim, Defendant denied any default of the Original Agreement and denied 
owing a debt to Plaintiff: Id. 
9. Toe Court dismissed the Previous Case on January 11, 2012 for lack of prosecution Id. 
10. Plaintiff served Defendant with a Complaint for the present case on May 13, 2014 and filed the 
Complaint with this Court on May 15, 2014. 
2 
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v;) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there is ''no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and ... the nx>ving party is entitled to judgrrent as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). On a motion for 
summary judgmmt, the court views the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovingparty. Morra v. Grand County, 2010 UT 21, ,r 12,230 P.3d 1022, 1026 
(Utah 2010). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant moves for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the running of 
the statute of limitations covering the agreement between the Parties. An action may be brought within 
six years ''upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instnnnent in writing." Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) § 78B-2-309. The Parties entered into a written loan agreement, the Original Agreement, 
on April 24, 2006 initially tolling P1aintiff s limitation to bring a cause of action on that imtnnnent The 
statute of limitations for recovery of a debt may nonetheless be started or revived ''from the date: (a) the 
debt arose; (b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the debtor; or ( c) 
a payment is made on the debt by the debtor." Utah Code Ann (1953) § 78B-2-113(1). Ifan action 
is barred by provision of the statute of limitations, "it shall be unavailable ... as a caU5e of action" Utah 
Code Ann (1953) § 78B-2-113(2). The actions of the Parties in this case did renew a limitations 
period, but not after May 12, 2008. Because PJaintiffserved and filed the Complaint after May 12, 
3 
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2014 and the statute of limitations had run, Plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations and has no 
present cause of action against Defendant. 
1. The six year statute of limitations has run in this case and the Parties' actions did 
not renew the tolling under§ 78B-2-113(l)(a) or (l)(c). 
The Parties' entered into the Original Agreement on April 24, 2006 and the statute of limitations 
began nnming as of that date llllder § 78B-2- l 13(1)(a), when the "debt arose." Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) § 78B-2- l 13. As a result of§ 78B-2-113(l)(c), which renews the limitations period upon 
payment on the debt, the statute of limitations restarted on each successive payment made by 
Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that on February 15, 2008, Defendant failed to make the monthly payment 
on the Original Agreement, ending the renewal of the statute of limitations for payment on the debt. 
Even if Defendant's payment of$200 to Plaintiff on May 9, 2008 constituted payment on the debt 
llllder the Original Agreement, the six-year statute of limitations had nm before Plaintiff served the 
Complaint in this case. 
2. The Parties' actions did not renew the statute of limitations by written 
acknomedgement of the debt or promise to pay under§ 78B-2-113(l)(b). 
The limitations period for bringing a cause of action on a written instrument can be renewed by 
"a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay ... by the debtor." Utah Code Ann (1953) 
§ 78B-2-113(l)(b). Either a written acknowledginent or a promise to pay is sufficient to renew the 
limitation period tmder this provision and both are not required. Beck v. Dutchman Coal. Mines Co., 
2 Utah2d 104, 108,269 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 1954). 
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On May 9, 2008, the parties agreed orally that Defendant would pay $200 per month toward 
the debt owed to Plaintiff on the Original Agreeirent and Defendant tendered $200 the same day. 
Whether this was a wholly new oral agreement as Defendant suggests or a modification to the Original 
Agreement as the Plaintiff suggests, the result is the same. If a new oral agreement, the renewal 
provision would toll a four-year limitations period from May 9, 2008, when "the debt arose." Utah 
Code Am (1953) § 78B-2-l 13(l)(a); Utah Code Ann (1953) § 78B-2-307(l)(a) ("An action may 
be brought within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment received upon a contract, 
obligation, or liability not fotmded upon an ins~nt in writing'). If the Parties' agreeirent made an 
oral modification of material tenm to the written Original Agreement, the four-year statute of limitations 
for oral agreements would begin May 9, 2008. Strand v. Union Pc. R. Co., 6 Utah 2d 279,282,312 
P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1957) ('where a specific material tenn of the contract in writing is subsequently 
changed orally, the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts applies'l In either case, the statute 
of limitations had nm before Plaintiff initiated this case and Plaintiff has no cause of action against 
Defendant. Even if the Court were to apply a six-year statute of limitations, that period to11s on May 9, 
2008, ''from the date ... a promise to pay is made by the debtor." Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 
78B-2-l 13(l)(b). 
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that Defendant aclmowledged the debt in a March 25, 2011 
Answer and Counterclaim in a separate case between the parties on the same issues. 1 Interpreting 
'acknowledgement of the debt', the Supreme Court of Utah explained that: 
No set phrase or particular form of1anguage is required; anything that will indicate that the party 
making the acknowledgment admits that he is still liable on the claim, that he is still bound for its 
1 Goldenwest Federal Credit Union v. Kathleen Kenworthy, case no. 110905153 DC (Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Cmmty, State of Utah) (2011 ). 
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satisfaction, that he is still held for its liquidation and payment, is sufficient to revive the debt or 
claim 
Beck v. Dutchman Coal. Mines Co., 2 Utah2d 104,108,269 P.2d 867,869 (Utah 1954), quoting 
Elder v. Dyer, 26 Kan 604, 610 (Kan 1881 ), ( overruled on a separate issue by Bernard v. 
Davidson, 112 Kan 31, 209 P. 668 (Kan 1922). 
An "acknowledgment necessary to start the statute anew must be more than a hint, a reference, 
or a discussion of an old debt; it nrust amount to a clear recognition of the claim and liability as presently 
existing." Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtliff, 83 Utah 488, 30 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1934), quoting 
In re Gilman, Son and Co., 57 F.2d 294,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). 
In the 2011 Counterclaim, Defendant admitted entering into the Original Agreement on April 
24, 2006, but denied any outstanding debt obligation to Plaintiff Goldenwest v. Kenworthy, case no. 
110905153 DC (Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah) (2011), Answer and 
CoW1terclairn The 2011 C01.mterclaim presented no clear recognition of the debt owed to Plaintiff and 
no corresponding liability. Because the 2011 Counterclaim does not admit liability on Plaintiff's claim, 
Defendant's pleading is not an acknowledgment of the debt necessary to revive the statute of limitations 
under§ 78B-2-l 13(1)(b). 
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vJ 
CONCLUSION 
The applicable statute of limitations had nm prior to Plaintiff initiating the present action. The 
actions of the Parties did not renew the statute of limitations necessary to protect Plaintiffs cause of 
action and Plaintifrs claim is barred by§ 78B-2-l 13(2) and § 78B-2-309(2) (six year statute of 
limitations). Defendant's Motion for Smmnary Judgment is hereby GRANTED .. 
Dated this ~ayo~ 2014. 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. I3lackbum(0355) 
A llorneJ,'S for Goldenwest Federal Credit Union 
372 24th Street. Suite 400 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (80 I) 394-5783 
FAX: (801) 627-2522 
Email: thlnckbunv\·1:vnnctlll .i.:0111 
IN THE THIRD ,JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDENWEST FEDERAL CREDIT 
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SHANNA HOWELL, first being sworn, deposes and says: 
l. I am employed by Plaintiff, Goldenwest Federal Credit Union, in the 
Collections Department. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit. 
3. If I were called to testify, I could testify as to the facts contained in this 
affidavit. 
4. In the Collection Notes attached as an exhibit to this affidavit, lam identified 
as '·User 500". My notes regarding my interaction with Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
Kathleen Kenworthy, are recorded on the Collection Notes as User 500. 
S. On May 8. 2009, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Kathleen Kenworthy, made 
a $200 payment over the telephone, using her VISA Card No. XXXXXXXXXXXX3346. 
A copy of the receipt for said $200.00 payment made on May 8, 2009, is attached hereto, 
marked as Exhibit '·A". Also attached is a copy of the Collection Notes entered on May 9, 
2008, noting that Kathleen Kenworthy stated that she would call ''next month and do the 
same•·. At that time, I informed her that her payments would stay due on the I 5th day of each 
month. 
6. Defendant Kathleen Kenworthy's next payment was due June 15, 2009. 
Kathleen Kenwo1thy did not make the June 15. 2009 payment. 
7. Defendant/ Counterclaim Plaintiff Kathleen Kenworthy called Plaintiff on 
June l 0, 2008 and said Htowing place has now taken possession of her wrecked vehicle. I told 
her it was wrecked and we didn't want it. She said she could have sold it, but we wouldn,t 
• 2 -
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release the title to her, so she said this is lender liability and she won't pay us and will get nn 
attorney." Sec Collection Notes marked as Exhibit .;B'', attached, entry dated June 10, 2008. 
SHANNA HOWELL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.i'\J to before me by Shanna Howell, this)?.'.'--'-' day of 
August, 2014. 
4S27,.J217-l-l20, V. I 
671 :97l70vl 
,..._ ____ IP'"______ ,c -
. l. 
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to give to jennifer for legal 
07/07/2008 12:13p User 124 Loan 01 
What is being done to collect on repo 
def? 
06/10/2008 3:43p User 500 Loan 01 
cont --has agreed to ser.d ea mo to us 
w.i.th cuna we can send them $100 ea mo 
that will help with pmts to them also 
--this was not what she w3nted to hear 
was all our fault she cld have sold this 
wrecked vehilcle for $4000 and pd on her 
loan -she was mad and ended our 
conversation 
06/10/2008 3:40p User 500 Loan 01 
kathleen called upset as towing place 
has now taken poss of her wrecked 
vehci le she wanted to kr.ow why we diclnt 
t ld her because was wre•:ked and we diclnt 
want it --sd she she cld of sold it but 
we wouldnt release the title to her so 
she sd this is lender liability and she 
wont pay us will get an atty --i 
explaind cuna insur pmt to her tld her 
this in insurance on our loss not hers 
and she is still liable for full amt of 
loan --tld her we cld split the $200 she 
05/10/2008 11:19p User904 Loan 01 
Payment of 200.00 made on 05/09/08 
toward a 487.21 payment due on 
02/15/08. Loan delinquent for 85 days. 
05/09/2008 11 :58a User 500 Loan 01 
kathleen called back vmtac: to know if 
she can now sell/dispose of vehicle as 
still is tow yard --to help on bal owing 
--i discussed this with jennifer sd now 
that she has made arrangements on bal 
she can dispose of this 
05/09/2008 10:48a User 500 Loan 01 
ran visa thru £or the $200 ---posted pmt 
--mailed receipt 
we can bring acct currant after 3 good 
faith pmts 
05/09/2008 10:13a User 500 Loan 01 
i called kathleen --made pmt 
arrangements for $200 mo on this repo 
dif --best for now may be able to do 
more later --she will be changing jobs 
next month as her co is closing her dept 
down - -will get back to me with new poe 
info ----she wanted to make her 1st $200 
pmt 2day with her visa --sd will call me 
next m~·and do same --pmts will stay due 
on the!lSth of:mo 
05/09/2008 H:18p User 904 Loan 01 
Payment of 17,549.60 made on 05/08/08 
toward a 487.21 payment due on 
02/15/08. Loan delinquent for 84 days. 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
(Pursuant to Rule 24{0(1)(C)) 
I hereby certify that Appellant's Brief is compliant with the type-volume 
limitations of Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant's Brief contains 
4,360 words. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of Janu ry, 2016. 
KNOWLES, P.C. 
Attorney for Goldenwest Fed. Credit Union 
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